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Abstract: The specific demands of supply chains built upon large and complex IoT systems, make it
a must to design a coordinated framework for cyber resilience provisioning, intended to guarantee
trusted supply chains of ICT systems, built upon distributed, dynamic, potentially insecure, and
heterogeneous ICT infrastructures. As such, the solution proposed in this paper is envisioned to
deal with the whole supply chain system components, from the IoT ecosystem to the infrastructure
connecting them, addressing security and privacy functionalities related to risks and vulnerabilities
management, accountability, and mitigation strategies, as well as security metrics and evidence-based
security assurance. In this paper, we present FISHY as a preliminary architecture that is designed
to orchestrate existing and beyond state-of-the-art security appliances in composed ICT scenarios.
To this end, the FISHY architecture leverages the capabilities of programmable networks and IT
infrastructure through seamless orchestration and instantiation of novel security services, both in
real-time and proactively. The paper also includes a thorough business analysis to go far beyond the
technical benefits of a potential FISHY adoption, as well as three real-world use cases highlighting
the envisioned benefits of a potential FISHY adoption.
Keywords: cybersecurity; supply chains; IoT systems; systems integration; real scenarios analysis
1. Introducing the Scenario
The unstoppable evolution of ICT systems, with innovative technologies and business
models, is driving a massive digital transformation, turning into the Industry 4.0 revolution.
At the same time, the larger a society’s dependence on ICT systems, the more critical the
effects of any ICT infrastructure disruption will be. Today, the resilience of ICT systems is
premium, and every ICT system is expected to implement at least a set of basic mechanisms
to prevent, resist, and recover from any type of disruption in a timely manner, thus
minimizing the impact on service quality and user experience. Particularly in complex
ICT supply chain scenarios, the ICT implementation of physical supply chains, serving
multiple actors in finance, manufacturing, healthcare, and many other sectors, not only
individual parts of the supply chain need to be secured and reliably provisioned, but also
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the end-to-end process of securing the ICT supply chain. In real words, however, and
according to an IBM/Ponemon study, 77% of organizations that individually or jointly
participate in a supply chain process do not even have an incident response plan. The
National Cybersecurity Alliance found that 60% of SMEs would be out of business within
six months of being hit by a cyber attack [1]. On the other hand, the concept of cyber
resilience is expected to become the norm, and one of the key measures of an ICT system’s
ability to continue its operations in the event of a cyber attack (be it either software or
hardware) or incident. According to the US National Institute for Standards and Technology
(NIST), cyber resilience is defined as “the ability to anticipate, withstand, recover from, and adapt
to adverse conditions, stresses, attacks, or compromises on systems that include cyber resources” [2].
Therefore, it is imperative today in achieving cyber resilience of any ICT system, which is
particularly a challenge in the presence of disruptions, whether they be due to malicious
security attacks or due to unreliable hardware and software system components and
their implementations.
1.1. Background
In practice, an efficient resilience strategy would ideally leverage the following three
main components: (i) continuous availability, enabled by both the deployment of strategies
to guarantee an “always-on” customer experience, and the required protection in front of
disruptions; (ii) IT workload mobility, permitted by the deployment of strategies facilitating
traffic offloading and resource migration in a distributed computing environment, includ-
ing edge and cloud computing; and (iii) multi-cloud agility (also including hybrid clouds
and coordinated edge-cloud), to determine the optimal set of resources that best match the
expected level of resilience for each application. These three components are driving the
deployment of the corresponding policies to provide security, trust, and performance guar-
antees, coupled with efficient network and compute infrastructure management strategies,
in order to optimize the resource allocation, self-healing, and dynamic reconfiguration of
ICT resources. Moreover, it is not the integration of these policies and strategies that must
be pursued, but their effective coordination in complex multistakeholder ICT infrastructure
scenarios. To this end, coordinated methods are also needed to forecast and accurately
estimate vulnerabilities and risks potentially impacting the performance. In turn, these
forecasts can be used to assess potential risk for security and privacy, and the related
accountability and mitigation strategies, as well as the solutions to operate resilient services
on top of potentially unreliable infrastructure components. It is, in fact, a major open
challenge to providing these properties end-to-end, i.e., across the entire ICT supply chain.
A further challenge to be addressed in the context of cyber resilience is its strong link
to cybersecurity. Cybersecurity is one of the greatest challenges of our era. In May 2017, the
WannaCry malware cyber attack infected more than 200,000 computers across 150 countries,
with the total damages estimated to be hundreds of millions of Euros [3]. During the same
year, more than 26% of US healthcare consumers experienced a breach of their healthcare
data, which included their social security number, contact information, electronic medical
record, or health insurance ID [4]. This is hugely reflected and significantly amplified
in the supply chain realm, among several other factors, because of the potential of the
so-called domino effect. According to [5], there were reports of a worm “Stuxnet” that
reportedly infiltrated Siemens industrial control software and later impacted the operation
of an Iranian nuclear plant through the ICT supply chain. Also, in [6], it was reported that
components of the Boing airliner were failing due to glitches in the Japanese supply chain
production that globally affected airports and grounded airliners in India, Chile, and the
United States. In [7], the authors reported, from their work in an EU project, that the major
crimes encountered by supply chain stakeholders in Europe were theft in transit (23%),
data theft/cybercrime (11%), bogus companies (10%), and insider fraud (10%). Also, other
crimes were reported, including smuggling (9%), counterfeiting (9%), and terrorism (6%).
Less frequent in the past, but possibly a bigger threat in the future, were also environmental
crimes in the supply chain [8].
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Finally, according to Appknox [9], the number of attacks in 2019 grew notably when
compared to previous years. Moreover, even worse, the same study reports that “ . . . by
the year 2020, the costs related to damage caused by cybersecurity breaches may reach $5 trillion
and that is why it becomes essential to ensure that your business’ infrastructure is up-to-date and
ready to ward off cybercrimes”.
These examples illustrate that cyber attacks affect the whole spectrum of services and
the application domains simultaneously, and do not distinguish between e-health and social
media services anymore, or industrial IoT and telecom operator networking devices, when
choosing their targets. This alone establishes a strong interlink between cyber resilience and
cybersecurity. Cyber resilience, while relying on cybersecurity, also assumes that not all
parts of the system can be cybersecure, not only for economic reasons, but also for reasons of
usability and scalability. Hence, establishing a proper link between cyber resilience and the
fundamental pillars of cybersecurity is another challenge. To this end, a proper evaluation
of the cybersecurity process is needed. For instance, Symantec [10] proposes a five-pillar
approach to building the cybersecurity part of a cyber resilience plan (Figure 1).
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Today, governments, enterprises, and individuals are systematically and collectively
outpaced in managing their cybersecurity systems and appliances, by external attackers,
intern l threats, and fundamentally unreliable and unsecured components of ICT systems.
The threat is not just basic se sitive information being stolen anymore, or a website being
deactivated, but a plethora of quiet and unforeseeable threats, where attackers creep in
and can change a system’s behaviour and network configuration at their will [11]. These
attacks are polymorphic in nature and sophisticated, using previously unseen custom
codes that are able to communicate with external command and control entities to update
their functionality, or even implement themselves entirely from code fra ments that they
intelligently harvest from benign programs, scripts, and software blocks that are already
present in the cybersecurity system in place [12].
1.2. Challe ges
Due to the dynamicity and sophistication of the current cybersecurity and privacy
threats, security administrators and IT operators must face the following five unprece-
dented challenges when trying to make their system resilient.
Challenge 1: Need for end-to-end solutions for vulnerabilities and risks management
With around 350,000 new malware programs appearing every day [13], and 88% of
respondents [14] from medium-size companies replying that they receive up to 500 se-
vere/critical alerts per day, it is evident that only a limited percentage (~1%) of the critical
threats are analyzed, which indicates the lack of effective methods to characterize, detect,
classify, forecast, and estimate threats, risks, vulnerabilities, and suspicious activities. On
one hand, the challenge is not just detecting the vulnerability itself, but rather building an
innovative solution to manage the whole vulnerabilities lifecycle, including the character-
istics mentioned above, and the vulnerabilities propagation within the entire end-to-end
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supply chain too. On the other hand, cybersecurity and privacy risks must also be accu-
rately estimated within the entire supply chain, to meet performance expectations through
an appropriate data sharing mechanism [15], as well as to enable dynamic updates through
real-time awareness of ICT systems’ actual states.
Challenge 2: Lack of evidence-based metrics for security assurance and trust guarantees
Security and trust assurance should not only be inferred from an observed absence of
security incidents; this observation may be an indication of the absence of attacks during
the monitored period or the incapacity of the system to detect attacks. Similarly, security
assurance must not only leverage on trust, but on evidences supporting specific security
claims. However, there is a lack of effective metrics to characterize composed ICT systems
performance with regards to cybersecurity and privacy, thus making it difficult to provide
the certification of complex systems. Similarly to how physical goods require metrics to
distinguish between high-quality goods and low-quality goods (e.g., cotton, wood, or a
car), the ICT supply chain also requires effective metrics, or else one cannot distinguish
between highly secure and low-security parts in the supply chain. Consequently, it is
necessary to define both the security claims and the set of metrics used to characterize
these claims, and choose the proper evidence for each specific claim. In the context of
certification, the former can be aligned with the objectives within the considered scope and
target of the certification, and the latter can provide the necessary certification auditable
evidence needed to verify the (continuous, where needed) compliance with the desired
objectives. The mentioned evidence and metrics must be identified in the early stages of
the ICT system design, towards a security and trust by design approach that optimizes the
obtained results and minimizes the costs, while also considering the relevant certification
and regulatory requirements of each of the covered domains, to ensure that the intrica-
cies (both in terms of objectives as well as associated controls and needed evidence) are
comprehensively covered.
Challenge 3: Cumbersome coordination in multi-actor and multi-vendor supply chains of ICT systems
Security analytics, and operation technologies and mechanisms are characterized by
complexity, as organizations are dealing with 10 to 25 different technologies [16], and
involve IT administrators, network architects, software developers, and several other roles
within different contexts. Their interaction is complex and encompasses organizational
structures as well as supply ICT chain processes to design, construct, manage, and protect
the ICT supply chain. Given such a heterogeneous and complex cybersecurity ecosystem,
the process of coordination and orchestrated management of security appliances to provide
trusted supply chains, as well as acquisition and configuration of new tools by the network
administrators and IT operators, becomes a challenging endeavor. One of the daunting
demanding challenges is reflected in security policies that are often specified by people
who are different from the software developers actually implementing them, which leads
to misconfigurations and improper responses to threats and attacks, mainly due to the
diversity of development contexts, multi-vendor security controls, and technology matu-
rity levels. Gartner estimates that 70% to 99% of data breaches result not from external,
concerted attacks, but from misconfigurations (human error, software update, or technical
malfunction) of the affected IT systems [17]. Also, in an entire supply chain scenario, there
is not a single user controlling the whole system, thus lacking strict identity management
and accountability mechanisms.
Challenge 4: Static cybersecurity networked configurations and dynamic systems audit
Even when a security policy is successfully developed and implemented, the security
systems in use are rather static with respect to the highly dynamic threat prevention and
mitigation techniques needed. In most of the cases, neither the network elements nor the
security appliances support a reconfiguration framework to meet the pace of the highly dynamically
changing nature of cyber threats. The ease of attacking an ICT supply chain is largely due to
the network. In fact, the network actually significantly amplifies the security threat in the
supply chain. While newly proposed concepts of network function virtualization (NFV)
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and, previously, of software-defined networking (SDN) have opened up the window of
opportunity to dynamically control the network, this has neither be used in connection
with dynamic security policy enforcement nor for the effective protection against cyber
threats; instead, it is quite the contrary [18]. The network challenge is further exacerbated
when considering the influx of the resource-constrained nature of IoT devices and the
myriad of potentially insecure devices to all be interconnected in a typically complex ICT
system today. This requires innovative methods to developing resilient systems on top of a
myriad of fundamentally insecure components and novel tools to better audit the different
systems and interconnected components.
Challenge 5: Unlikely wide adoption of integrated cybersecurity solutions for composed ICT systems
While several commercial cybersecurity solutions exist, offering integrated solutions to
network and IT administrators, integrated solutions, in general, only remain beneficial for
specialized environments (military, governments, large financial player). In the commercial
sector, integrated approaches are proven to be complex, and require large operational
expenses, along with a high learning curve for human administrators of complex integrated
systems. Indeed, training security administrators on how to orchestrate and implement
security services on new systems, in a highly specialized platform solution, takes significant
time and financial effort. In fact, these solutions are not designed to meet the requirements
of fast-evolving, large-scale heterogeneous systems, as in typical supply chains built on top
of complex ICT systems, or to facilitate the proper data sharing and performance metrics
benchmarking for ICT systems among different stakeholders. Thus, new approaches are
needed to facilitate a coordinated, rather than integrated, deployment of cybersecurity
solutions, considering the complexity of supply chains putting together composed ICT
systems from different stakeholders, handled by human resources with different levels of
skills in ICT management.
1.3. Contributions
Taking into consideration the challenges identified above, in this paper, an architecture
for cybersecurity provisioning in supply chains built on complex ICT systems is proposed.
More specifically, the contributions of this work are as follows:
- A thorough literature review on the main relevant areas is given, including informa-
tion security assessment, policy-based systems, trust monitoring, authentication, and
threat anomaly detection, among others.
- The presentation of an innovative architecture, referred to as FISHY, designed to
provide cybersecurity guarantees in the supply chains of complex ICT systems, con-
sisting of the following: (i) innovative integrated services that are capable of managing
the intent-based orchestration of security appliances through a well-defined toolset;
(ii) an evidence-based security assurance and certification methodology; and (iii) a
multi-party supply chain verification and forecasting system based on distributed
ledger technology (DLT).
- A discussion on several business aspects, aiming at emphasizing the impact of the
proposed architecture, as well as its potential adoption by key stakeholders.
- The introduction of three real industrial pilots, highlighting the theoretical benefits
brought in by a possible deployment of the proposed FISHY architecture.
1.4. Outline
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 revisits the literature in the closely related
research areas that this paper focuses on. Then, Section 3 introduces the proposed FISHY
architecture, along with its functional blocks. Section 4 describes the business scenario,
emphasizing the involved stakeholders and potential market opportunities, as well as the
factors that may hinder a wide adoption of the proposed solution. Next, Section 5 presents
three real industrial use cases as potential supply chain scenarios benefitting from a FISHY
deployment. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
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2. Review of the State-of-the-Art
This section revisits the current literature in fields closely linked to the proposed
FISHY architecture.
2.1. Information Security Assessment
Information security assessment (or cybersecurity assessment) can be defined in
different ways, according to the standards already available (mainly from ISO/IEC, CEN,
and NIST). Some of them are focused on the devices’ security requirements accomplishment,
others on the environment’s threat levels, and others on the effectiveness of the security
control in place [19]. Those standards also help to characterize the assessment process,
usually based on the technical analysis of the components (including vulnerability analysis),
working tests (typically taking the component as a block-box), or just surveying functioning
perception by operators [20]. Whichever method is used, a key central issue is always the
quality of the metrics used (frequently constrained by observability). In fact, the security
metrics problem has been researched in the last years and, despite some solutions for
particular cases (such as smart grids or nuclear plants), there are no recognized generic
models satisfying most implementations, particularly those where system diversity is the
main characteristic, such as in the IoT paradigm [21–23].
A good metric should have some fundamental properties (i.e., objective, measurable,
attainable, repeatable, accurate, and time-dependent), and it can be linked to several
system dimensions, such as networks, software, users, and policies, eventually with
a more fine-grained sub-classification scheme [22–24]. Several scientific contributions
addressing the metric definition problem may be found in the literature, from ontological
classification schemes to models supporting the metrics definition, such as the MDGSM
(method for designing good security metrics) [22]. The subject was also targeted by
well-recognized standards (e.g., ISO 27004 and NIST SP 800-53), which normally include
application guides [25,26]. Finally, there are some attempts to use more complex multi-
criteria solutions that explore relations and dependencies between different metrics, aiming
to improve the decision-making process [27]. However, none of the aforementioned works
can support an efficient set of metrics addressing the complexity and diversity present in
IoT-based solutions.
2.2. Policy-Based Systems
Networks are traditionally configured (and reconfigured) manually, or with a very
limited support from automatic tools. The rapid adoption of new IoT technologies has
furthermore increased the ever-growing complexity and heterogeneity of modern IT infras-
tructures. Having a fully protected and efficient network in this scenario is thus becoming
increasingly difficult, requiring the use of automatic tools to handle it in a timely and
error-free manner.
To ease the pain of configuring a network, the introduction of systems that can
automatically refine high-level security policies into either specific configurations or lower-
level policies, has been already proposed in the current scientific literature. Very few papers
exist on this subject [28–30], and the adoption of an automatic refinement workflow in
production systems has been scarce to non-existent for several reasons. First, automatically
translating high-level policies to lower-level policies or configurations is pretty difficult
and requires a significant level of intelligence, unless the policies are very simple, or the
landscape has a trivial architecture. Intrusion prevention systems (IPS), such as Snort [31]
and Suricata [32], can be thought as a form of simplified policy refinement system, since
they can be effectively configured to automatically use different reaction policies when an
attack is detected. Despite the adoption of IPS solutions in production environments, their
“refinement engine” only limits their usability in situations when the countermeasure is
nearly trivial (e.g., drop all the suspected attacker packets). Second, translating a policy is
not enough in complex scenarios. Once a set of security configurations is generated, it is
also important for this set to be deployed in the right order, to prevent a temporary insecure
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state where the network security level may be too low. Virtually, no policy refinement
system, as of today, offers this capability.
2.3. Trust Monitoring
Traditional strong integrity verifications of IT infrastructure nodes are performed on
physical nodes via the remote attestation procedure. This procedure was standardized
by the Trusted Computing Group [33], as a method to provide hardware-based integrity
verification of an IT system, via an ad hoc chip named the TPM (trusted platform module).
This strategy allows the continuous checking of the status of the software, services, and
configurations deployed on a host [34,35]. This approach is, however, not necessarily
ideal in highly virtualized environments, where most of the jobs are running into virtual
machines and, especially, containers (lightweight virtual machines). In using this approach,
in fact, virtual machines can be attested at deployment time, but cannot at runtime though.
While remote attestation allows the verification of the integrity of the software only,
it cannot be used to check the traffic forwarded through the network. The classic way
to detect unauthorized changes to the traffic flows is to make use of secure channels via
specific protocols, such as TLS [36] or IPsec [37]. Although all these technologies ensure the
confidentiality of a transmission (via encryption) or its authenticity/integrity (via digital
signatures or MACs), unfortunately they do not verify if a packet was effectively sent,
received, or traversed all nodes it was supposed to go through.
2.4. Authentication and Authorization/Security Requirement Management
It is widely accepted that the characteristics inherent to devices located at the edge of
the network (such as the IoT devices) are making it difficult to provide security guarantees
to their users, thus potentially hindering a large adoption of such devices to support
innovative services. Although some contributions addressing this problem may be found
in the literature, such as, for example, solutions based on the physical unclonable functions
(PUF) concept [38], additional research efforts are still needed to suitably handle aspects
such as the device mobility, heterogeneity, and low computing capacity, which may add
serious risks to all scenarios where these devices are to be deployed. Thus, any system,
platform, or solution leveraging IoT devices to run services must support several security
requirements as those listed below [39]:
- Authentication: Edge devices must be authenticated to both the cloud (upper layer)
and other edge devices (lower layer), allowing only authorized nodes to communicate
and retrieve data. One of the main challenges here is to authenticate constrained
IoT devices.
- Secure data sharing and data aggregation: Data sharing between the edge and cloud
must be encrypted, and data aggregation in intermediate layers must be similarly
managed. However, handling data sharing and aggregation in a distributed way
demands for a novel security management approach to be designed.
- Secure service discovery: In order to only provide services to authorized users, ser-
vices must be discovered and delivered in a secure manner, to avoid fake users and
fake nodes.
- Malicious nodes detection: Distributed nodes are vulnerable to external and inter-
nal hardware or software attacks. Hence, a mechanism is needed to detect mali-
cious nodes.
- Secure virtualization: Nodes must provide a secure virtualization environment
to avoid malicious virtual machines, virtualization attacks, as well as to prevent
an attacker to take control over either the hardware or the operating system, to
launch attacks.
All these requirements must be met in a highly heterogeneous environment, where
multiple nodes (IoT devices) are unstoppably joining and leaving.
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2.5. Threat and Anomaly Detection
The automatic detection of traffic anomalies and network cyber attacks is not a novelty.
Intrusion detection systems (IDS), such as Snort, Bro [40], and Suricata, are frequently
used in production IT infrastructures. They usually detect threats by looking at specific
patterns in the traffic, using advanced pattern matching rules. IDS are not trained, but
are configured by experts with ad hoc pattern matching expressions, thus limiting their
effective usage for at least two reasons. On one hand, writing detection rules for new
attacks requires a significant amount of expertise and knowledge about a threat. On
the other hand, zero-day attacks and recently discovered ones can pass through an IDS
undetected, unless their fingerprint is very similar to another one in the intrusion detection
system internal database.
To overcome such limitations, the current scientific literature started using supervised
and unsupervised machine learning approaches to provide trainable attack detection tools
with high accuracy. However, the current state-of-the-art is mostly focused on detecting
anomalous traffic [41], without classifying the attacks, and the few articles devoted to
attack classification are mostly limited to denial-of-services and volumetric attacks [42], as
well as hazard detection and differentiation [43].
2.6. Threat Intelligence and Information Sharing
Security information and event management (SIEM) solutions aim at providing real
time analysis and management of security alerts. They are commonly used in production
environments, to have a global picture of the security status of an IT infrastructure, and
can allow administrators to perceive a threat before it can maximize its damage [44].
Despite that Internet of Things devices are starting to become ubiquitous, unfortu-
nately, traditional SIEM systems have limited capacities to interface with IoT devices and
embedded systems. Consequently, research efforts are required to facilitate SIEM opera-
tions in IoT-based scenarios. One potential improvement may reside on minimizing the
number of possible false positives, through improving SIEM import capabilities by facilitat-
ing SIEM to receive relevant structured data from multiple data sources. To this end, MISP
(malware information sharing platform), along with the addition of the trust and reputation
module, which will perform the needed analysis and enrichment before injecting the data
into the SIEM itself, may be adopted. Another area of improvement would refer to the
possibility of extracting new IDS rules from these enriched events through MISP, later to be
dynamically sent to the SIEM, thus exploiting the built-in sharing capabilities of the former.
2.7. Identity Management and Accountability
The current identity management (IdM) systems are mostly based on centralized
solutions, such as corporate directory services, domain name registries, federated services,
or certificate authorities. However, these approaches are facing several issues, being
fragmented and siloed between various service providers, thus limiting the adoption of
a holistic view and delivering poor user experience. The upcoming reliance on billions
of IoT devices makes it untenable to have all those devices controlled by a centralized
identity provider, since a breach of this provider would be disastrous not only for revealing
personal data and misallocation of virtual resources, but also for attacking the physical
infrastructure, including the IoT devices.
The emergence of distributed ledger technology (DLT) offers a promising solution,
easing the deployment of fully decentralized identity management strategies [45]. This
technology pushes the ownership of identity away from centralized services to the edges,
i.e., to individuals, so that the identities themselves are in control [46]. In this way, dis-
tributed ledgers provide a mechanism for managing a root of trust, with no need for a
centralized authority, thus removing the single point of failure issue. Recently, DLT-based
IdM solutions have been classified into the following two main categories: self-sovereign
digital identities and decentralized trusted identity. The solutions in the first category
offer self-sovereign identity through block-chain technology, where the owner has control
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over what information they share, without any external administrative authority [47].
Differently, the second set of applications offers a centralized service that provides identity
proofing through existing identifications, such as a passport and driving license. With
respect to the self-sovereign approaches, there are already a few of them providing authen-
tication and authorization capabilities. Bitid [48] is an open protocol that allows simple and
secure user login to cloud/web services, by authenticating the user based on the public
key and block-chain-based network. The authentication proves the identity of the user
to a service by signing a challenge. OpenID [49] is an open protocol that allows a user to
authenticate to multiple services without the need for creating multiple different identities
and passwords. It provides one unique identity to the user from some trusted identity
provider, which can be used to sign into other OpenID-enabled services. Based on OpenID,
NameID [50] is an experimental technology, which allows a user to register names that can
be associated with the user data. These data can be verified by everyone in the block-chain
network, but cannot be forged or censored by unauthorized attackers, and no one can
retrieve the data without explicit user consent. Finally, uPort [51] is a platform that allows
end users to establish a digital identity, which can be used as a user identity across multiple
services, without any password. It gives full control of the user’s sensitive data to the user,
by allowing users to own and control their digital assets, as well as to securely and selec-
tively disclose their data to counterparts to access digital services. Moreover, it allows users
to digitally sign and encrypt documents, data, messages, transactions, and to send these
contents over the distributed ledger network to interact with decentralized applications.
2.8. Intent-Based Services
The automatic network management can reduce the network administrator’s tasks
(network configuration, configuration change, etc.), and may leverage the concepts of
policy or intent.
Policy-based network management (PBNM) [52] is a technique that enables the updat-
ing of network configurations with network administrator’s policies. PBNM enables poli-
cies to be defined, which manages network resources and ensures that network resources
are appropriately allocated to users. Policies are formulated using the event–condition–
action (ECA) rule and are described using the “if condition then action” rule. The common
open policy service (COPS) [53] protocol has been standardized in the Internet Engineer-
ing Task Force (IETF). It has a simple query and response form, and it exchanges policy
information between a policy server and its clients. Recently, the Simplified Use of Policy
Abstraction (SUPA) working group has discussed data models of policies in the IETF. In
the conventional management of network states, the simple network management protocol
(SNMP) has been widely deployed based on a request–response form. Recently, the net-
work configuration protocol (NETCONF) [54] has been discussed in the IETF NETCONF
working group. The NETCONF is a management protocol for correcting the states of
network devices and updating their configuration, and is based on an XML form. Yet
another next generation (YANG) [55] is a data modelling language that is used to design
configuration and state data on the NETCONF protocol.
The concept of intent-based networking (IBN) has been proposed as a new network
management framework in OpenDaylight network intent composition [56]. An intent-
based interface has been pursued rigorously by IETF, and major open-source project
communities (ONF [57], ONOS [58], and OpenDaylight [59]) are working to provide a stan-
dardized intent-based northbound interface for SDN. An intent of a network administrator
is used to be expressed in the concrete description of configurations stored on devices,
to update configurations. To describe the intent, the concept of the intent-based network
modelling language has been discussed in IETF IB-Nemo [60] BoF, and a draft specification
and implementation of it is developed in the NEMO project [61–63]. Another specification
method was also developed by policy graph (e.g., PGA [64]).
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2.9. Artificial Intelligence
Network management and orchestration can require real-time (i.e., latency around
milliseconds) complex decision making as softwarization and virtualization of network
resources. Using artificial intelligence (AI) techniques enable historical, temporal, and
frequency network data to be analyzed. Indeed, artificial intelligence techniques, espe-
cially machine learning (ML) and statistical learning algorithms [65], can help the FISHY
framework to be intelligent as well as autonomous, i.e., to make network self-aware,
self-configurable, self-optimization, self-healing, and self-protecting systems [66]. Simul-
taneously, the AI-enabled functionalities taking advantage of intent-based networking,
NFV, SDN, network slicing, and security, will enable cognitive network management for
5G and beyond. The current development of network management solutions, including
CogNet, Selfnet, SONATA, and 5GeX [67], are focused on cognitive network management
for 5G devices. Thus, the work towards beyond 5G management solutions would require
an optimizing network as an entity in a secure, resilient, and cognitive IoT-fog-cloud infras-
tructure, taking advantage of in-network computing and communication to minimize the
overall energy footprint. However, the success of an intelligent and autonomous system
is defined by the AI techniques that can effectively be adopted in different parts of the
network management infrastructure. Thus, the intent orchestrator needs to provide not
only the handcrafted policies, but should also utilize the power of big data and computing
dynamic resources, making intelligent decision based on the processed data near the end
users, providing low latency, as well security, as required by critical surveillance, medical
applications, and many commercial applications [68]. Moreover, the work proposed in this
paper, towards defining the FISHY architecture, will exploit natural language processing
(NLP), i.e., the science of extracting the intention of text and relevant information from
text, to support the management of intents by the intent-based resilience orchestrator block.
Some popular “NLP as a service” platforms are as follows: (i) LUIS.ai [69] by Microsoft;
(ii) Wit.ai [70] by Facebook; (iii) Api.ai [71] by Google; and (iv) Watson [72] by IBM.
For the sake of illustration, Table 1 summarizes the review of the art in the research
fields related to the proposed cybersecurity solution.
Table 1. Relevant research areas for IoT complex supply chains including current advances and key issues.
Research Area State-of-the-Art Key Issues
Information Security Assessment
Device security requirements,
environment threat levels, assessment
process characterization
Quality of security metrics, metrics
properties, general model
Policy-based Systems Traditional manual configuration or sometools for limited automatization
Full protected scenario, high- to low-level
policies translation in non-simple
scenarios, configuration orchestration
Trust Monitoring Remote attestation procedure (TPM) Considering virtualized environments,traffic attestation (at packet-node level)
Authentication and Authorization Edge devices security provisioning is anopen challenge
Different authentication levels
considering constrained edge systems,
distributed data sharing, secure nodes
discovery, secure virtualization
Threat and Anomaly Detection IDS is commonly deployed inIT infrastructures
No trained systems rather limited
configurable systems, using ML
for training
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Table 1. Cont.
Research Area State-of-the-Art Key Issues
Threat Intelligence and
Information Sharing SIEM solutions
Current SIEM limitations to face IoT
systems, using MISP
Identity Management and Accountability Centralized solutions, recent DLT-basedIdM solutions
No holistic view, exploit existing
solutions to edge systems
Intent-based services Current automatized managementsolutions based on policies or intents
Deploy intent-based solutions to
orchestrate security actions in a human
friendly scenario
Artificial Intelligence
Several network management solutions
and NLP platforms exist,
benefiting from AI
Adopting AI to facilitate overall system
smartness and autonomy, considering
intents orchestration and NLP, deciding
where decisions should be taken
3. Architecture for Cybersecurity Provisioning
3.1. Concept and Approach
The proposed FISHY architecture aims at delivering a coordinated cyber-resilient
platform that would provide the appropriate set of tools and methods towards establishing
trusted supply chains of ICT systems, through novel evidence-based security assurance
methodologies and metrics, as well as innovative strategies for risk estimation and vulner-
abilities forecasting leveraging state-of-the-art solutions, leading to resilient complex ICT
systems, comprising the complete supply chain, particularly focusing on the IoT devices at
the edge and the network systems connecting them.
Addressing the challenges 1 to 5, the proposed architecture is not envisioned as an in-
cremental integrated cybersecurity solution, but rather as an extensible and programmable
framework that can flexibly orchestrate the whole set of ICT systems and security controls.
The aim is to provide an innovative cyber resilience framework, where complex ICT sys-
tems performance in an entire supply chain may be analyzed, in terms of the security, trust,
and privacy impact on performance. To this end, the proposed architecture seamlessly com-
bines advancements in several domains, including software-defined networking (SDN),
network function virtualization (NFV), intent-based networking, AI-based techniques, and
distributed ledger technologies (DLT).
The high-level architecture is depicted in Figure 2, where the entire supply chain,
including the involved stakeholders, is also shown. Each stakeholder participates in the
supply chain through resources and infrastructure, from data to IT infrastructure, either
as provided by the stakeholder itself or reachable through other stakeholders via core
network and clouds. The main concept relies on designing a security, trustworthy, and
certification layer, transversal to the whole set of stakeholders in the supply chain, intended
to make the entire ICT supply chain system resilient, but also to correctly measure the
complete security compliance and consequently trigger the required actions (mitigation,
reconfiguration, etc.), making sure that guarantees for a certain level of cyber resilience are
provided. It is worth mentioning that the proposed solution is envisioned to be deployed
on the entire set of devices and systems in the supply chain, most notably including the
IoT ecosystem. The latter includes heterogeneous IoT devices at various localities and
assumes their connections to gateways or hubs, edge, and cloud systems, as well as the
network infrastructure to connect them all. Figure 2 also introduces the proposed functional
architecture, where the following four principal functional modules are proposed: intent-
based resilience orchestrator and dashboard (IRO), security and certification manager
(SCM), trust manager (TM), and the secure infrastructure abstraction (SIA). The figure
also shows the key blocks within the SCM module, namely, the secure assurance and
certification management, and the enforcement and dynamic configuration, as well as the
trust and incident manager, and the security and privacy data space infrastructure, both
into the TM module. Starting from top to bottom, the intent-based resilience orchestrator
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and dashboard (IRO) module is designed to work as the user-centric interface, which is
responsible for translating and orchestrating input actions into intents, to be used by other
components. The security assurance and certification management is responsible for the
provision of the auditable, evidence-based evaluation and certification of the assurance
posture of complex ICT systems, based on identified security claims and metrics, setting the
roots for the definition of a pan-European process for the certification of devices, processes,
and systems, as required in today’s European market. The trust and incident manager
provides tools for assessing the security of the stakeholder’s device, component or/and
system. The enforcement and dynamic configuration block is responsible for making
the entire system cyber-resilient, even when including potentially insecure components,
based on the concepts of dynamic self-configuration. The security and privacy data
space infrastructure is responsible for the collection and storage of data generated from
the devices, processes, and components of the stakeholders’ ICT systems, being part of
the supply chain. Finally, secure infrastructure abstraction (SIA) is the infrastructure-
centric interface, and it works as a data interface between different edge/IoT or cloud
infrastructures and the FISHY platform.
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Figure 2. The technical overall concept.
A more detailed description of each individual module in the architecture is depicted
in Figure 3, also including the interaction with t e infrastr cture along the w ole supply
chain. Indeed, the whole set of individual components within the modules and blocks
defined in Figure 2 are represented in Figure 3. Each module, block, and component are
described next, to facilitate the overall understanding.
3.2. Intent-Based Resilience Orchestrator & Dashboard (IRO)
The intent-based resilience orchestrator and dashboard (IRO) aims at automating
the processing, storage, and management of intents, using natural language processing
(NLP) into security workflows, which will be translated to security functions within the
FISHY architecture. The processing and optimization of intents use AI, while keeping the
human-in-the-loop, depending on the desired level of automation, in order to control and
enforce a specific workflow that is able to react to new threats. The intent-based resilience
orchestrator is divided into six main components, the dashboard interface, learning and
reasoning, the knowledge base, the intent manager, intent compiler, and monitoring and
telemetry. The main objective of the dashboard interface is to provide a unified, harmonized,
and consistent application, interfacing the human serving as security administrator and the
FISHY platform, showing as services, high-level policies, risks and vulnerabilities exposure,
warnings, performance, metrics, etc. The inputs entered by the users of the dashboard
will be managed by the rest of the components in the IRO. The learning and reasoning
module receives rules or metrics from other blocks (e.g., TIM) and uses AI techniques to
learn from the experience acquired in previous executions (e.g., considering how the ICT
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systems react to security alerts, which policies fit better to different scenarios, and learning
from feedbacks from other modules), to predict the best decisions to be made, and to help
the FISHY administrator understand which policies to choose. This component generates
recommendations for the infrastructure operator, to drive automation to dynamically fix
policies and optimize the performance of the intent manager. The knowledge base stores
the relation between intents, corresponding workflows, and security policies. The intent
manager is responsible for handling the intents, while checking the conflicting policies
and guaranteeing the optimal implementation, depending on the dynamic rules chosen by
the infrastructure operator. The intent compiler deploys the configuration obtained from
the intent manager and will feed other modules in the FISHY architecture. Finally, unlike
the current commercial solutions, our implementation of the monitoring and telemetry
component is as follows: (i) able to dynamically monitor deployment changes enforced
by continuous dynamic scheduling, provisioning, and auto-scaling; (ii) lightweight, yet
effective and non-intrusive; and (iii) independent of any specific infrastructure technology.
FISHY will containerize a monitoring and telemetry solution, collecting and storing data
from different sources, including NFV infrastructure monitoring, Kubernetes infrastructure
monitoring, VNF monitoring, SDN monitoring, etc.
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3.3. Security Assurance a d Cert fication Management
Security assurance and certification management (SACM) is responsible for providing
an auditable, evidence-based evaluation and certification strategy for the assurance posture
of complex ICT systems, based on identified security claims and metrics, also intended
to boot strap the development of new models and tools that would lead to the definition
and future establishment of a pan-European process, to be followed for the certification of
devices, processes, and systems in the European market. The set of security metrics to be
applied at the device, component, and system level are stored in the respective component,
while the security assurance component is utilized for the proper configuration of the
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tests to be executed. The real-time, continuous assessment of the security posture of the
complex ICT systems will be enabled by a purpose-built evidence collection engine, which
will be responsible for aggregating the required evidence from multiple sources related to
the operation of individual components, as well as the overarching processes that these
components are involved in. This functional group of modules will also include audit and
certification functions, leveraging the evidence-based approach of the assurance solution
integrated into the FISHY platform. The certification block will provide evidence-based
security, reporting, and certification to the needs of different stakeholders, ranging from
senior management to external auditors and regulators, incorporating different access
levels to the respective users. Finally, the audit block will be responsible for initiating,
coordinating, and reporting to the IRO dashboard the auditing process results.
3.4. Enforcement and Dynamic Configuration
The enforcement and dynamic configuration (EDC) block is responsible for both
making the supply chain measurably reliable end-to-end, and assessing the reliable and
secure operation, even in the presence of potentially insecure components, based on the
concepts of dynamic self-configuration. The general approach includes a predefined set of
security features, based on an agnostic feature description language. This taxonomy allows
the identification and translation of dynamically intent-based cybersecurity responses
into specific configurations. Configurations are applied simultaneously at the network
topology level and at each network security function (NSF) configuration leveraging the
NFV technology. The main components in this functional block are the controller, planner,
and enforcer. The controller is a network controller, mapping from the network-specific
cyber threat solution to the actual NSF deployment and configuration. It can implement
changes to the edge network topology and to the configuration of the running NSFs, based
on the centralized FISHY intent-based resilience orchestration. This element will rely on an
existing NFV orchestrator (NFVO) northbound interface, mapping the intent-based security
policies to be translated and enforced on it. The register and planner is the component
where the NSFs will register their security capabilities to be used in enforcement actions,
using open standard interfaces, such as I2NSF [73]. The planner will use this information
to combine and decide the best NSFs to use, their topologies, and the configurations to
apply. Finally, the enforcer is the lower-level block of the EDC, continuously reconfiguring
the whole ICT system via the existing NSFs, based on the available capabilities. This block
will use standard (I2NSF) interfaces to NSFs whenever possible and support specific ones
when no standard is available.
3.5. Trust and Incident Manager
The trust and incident manager provides the tools to be used for assessing the security
of the stakeholder’s device, component or/and system. The vulnerability assessment tools
will move beyond state-of-the-art (e.g., w3af [74]), providing, among others, automated
vulnerability and risks analysis, or estimation and detection in source codes using deep
representation learning techniques. Indeed, the functionalities of this module cover the
following three important sub-processes: (i) determining and establishing assets on the
infrastructure; (ii) determining, naming, and prioritizing the vulnerabilities found in
the analyzed system, component, or environment; and (iii) proposing the most effective
mitigation actions. The vulnerability assessment will be in charge of providing the insight
of how the detected vulnerabilities may entail a risk, and understanding the degree of
weakness that the monitored infrastructure may present. Applying this to the FISHY supply
chain platform will make supply chains more resilient to threats and, more specifically, to
vulnerabilities. Moreover, although several kinds of vulnerability assessments (performed
on network, host, database, applications, etc.) may be found, from the FISHY perspective,
an assessment of the monitored ICT platform for the entire supply chain would make
more sense, given that supply chain platforms are usually made up of various components.
Consequently, it would also be appropriate to assess IoT devices if they are going to
Sensors 2021, 21, 6057 15 of 24
contribute to the ICT infrastructure of the supply chain. Incident detection tools will
be based on the outcome of the vulnerability assessment and will be based on machine
learning techniques. This component will provide smart processing based on the collected
data, thus covering several different research areas. FISHY plans to integrate incident
detection into a holistic process of cybersecurity hardening, increasing resilience and
enabling faster response time to incidents over the whole ICT infrastructure of a supply
chain, by leveraging existing open-source technologies, such as Wazuh [75], and integrating
and expanding the capabilities of the XL-SIEM (cross-layer security information and event
management), an event management tool that is oriented around enhancing normal SIEM
capabilities [76]. In FISHY, the functionality of the impact assessment block is oriented
around defining and outlining the existent relation between the status of the system and the
changes happening, involving the employment of both qualitative and quantitative data,
which are normally expected to be faced to various indicators within the assessed item.
Indeed, this block will help in determining how and to what extent the supply chain will be
affected should a change happen in the overall platform. The functionality of performing
the assessment within this block will be guided and assisted by cybersecurity tools, such
as the risk assessment engine (RAE) [77], as they can enhance the results in terms of
accuracy, saving time, and reliability. The mitigation component should be responsible for
limiting the scope of the expected impact analyzed on the impact assessment component,
by detecting anomalies from network/IoT data based on machine learning algorithms. In
FISHY, the mitigation mechanisms based on ML algorithms are proposed to work in the
following two different ways: online mode and offline mode. The threat/attack repository
will store the outcome of the trust and incident manager module whenever the analysis
leads to a threat or attack (be it software or hardware). The tools to be used to develop
this block are still to be decided; it is recognized that some repositories already exist and
that data sharing will be highly useful. Based on the immutability principle, the repository
will store the result, so the information may be used for the expected evidence-based
assessment, and also timely informing of other involved stakeholders. Finally, the smart
contract is the realization of the component that would alert the stakeholders when a
security-related service level agreement is violated.
3.6. Security and Privacy Data Space Infrastructure
The security and privacy data space infrastructure is responsible for the proper col-
lection and storage of data generated from the devices, processes, and components of the
stakeholders’ ICT systems, being part of the supply chain. It is based on the concept of
the distributed and decentralized data storage concept (e.g., IPFS or data lakes), in which
users hold a portion of the overall data, creating a resilient system for data storage and
sharing. The data adaptation component is responsible for the homogenization of data
coming at different intervals, in different data models (XML, JSON, small chunks of sensor
data, logfiles, etc.) and following different communication means (REST APIs, Pub/Sub,
etc.). Moreover, the identity manager is based on DLT, and is responsible for authenticating
the users/processes connected to the secure and distributed data space, while the access
policy component caters for preserving privacy per user accessing the data, according to
specific policies set by the stakeholder responsible for the dataset. In this respect, not all
users can access the whole set of data. Finally, the data anonymization component takes
care of the privacy of the dataset shared by the stakeholders.
3.7. Secure Infrastructure Abstraction (SIA)
The main goal of the secure infrastructure abstraction (SIA) is two-fold. On one hand,
it is intended to endow IoT systems with as many security guarantees as possible, assuming
the inherent trend for IoT or edge devices to be potentially insecure. Two components are
considered. The secure edge node (SEN) [78] is a software component designed to reside
at the edge layer, and aimed at providing, by default authentication to IoT/edge devices,
leveraging of an extensible blockchain architecture. This architecture provides a totally
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distributed and fault-tolerant chain of trust to IoT/edge devices, to be used to verify device
signatures and establish secure TLS connections between the devices. The network edge
device (NED) element will be in charge of controlling the network access of the protected
environments, providing assurance for traffic flows, and ensuring a proper deployment
and topology of the necessary monitoring and threat response functions. Security decisions
and actions, as defined by any FISHY component, will be translated into an enforcement
configuration in the NED, whenever appropriate. On the other hand, the secure infrastruc-
ture abstraction provides the proper means to the enforcement and dynamic configuration,
and the trust and incident manager to interact with the NFVI resources, regardless of the
particular technologies that are to be used (OpenStack, Kubernetes, AWS, OpenDaylight,
ONOS), SDN controllers, or other infrastructure managers. A technology agnostic view of
the infrastructure is foreseen in the proposed FISHY architecture. To this end, exposed API
endpoints can be used for the management of the network services and VNF instances. The
APIs can be further used to collect monitoring data from the NFVIs and the network ser-
vices, providing useful information about the infrastructure status, allocation of resources
for service deployment, VNF performance, etc.
4. Key Business Aspects
4.1. Market Considerations
Cybersecurity is an expanding business in recent years, mainly because IT infrastruc-
ture has been the focus part of cyber attacks, especially when more and more workloads
are moving to cloud and edge, and the risk will continue to grow with the IoT adoption.
Moreover, based on OVUM [79], less than 15% of organizations have developed a proactive
approach to cybersecurity and digital risk, paving the way for innovative solutions, such
as the one proposed in this paper.
Additionally, edge computing is ramping up in the technology market, with promising
revenue streams [80], where operators have a key role, either as edge locations owners,
as edge connectivity enablers, or as application enablers in edge. None of these potential
strategies will succeed without considering resilience and security.
The unprecedented success of the internet as, not only a global communication tool,
but also a powerful and indispensable mean to make business anywhere in the globe, has
sparked the fast and unstoppable evolution of ICT networks, with 5G and IoT as the current
main paradigms. Such a hectic pace has brought serious security issues. This, together
with the increasing value of the digital assets involved in the daily business processes
of companies and the clearer multistakeholder nature of the supply chains, makes ICT
networks an appealing target for cyber criminals. Cyber attacks evolve quickly, and their
potential effects are more and more dramatic, to the extent that they could damage entire
countries, disrupt national economies and degrade standards of living that were taken for
granted. In this eerie scenario, the need for cyber-resilient ICT networks pushes the market.
New cybersecurity products must address the need to anticipate the threats, to absorb the
impact of those threats, and to respond dynamically to ensure business continuity. The
impact of IoT makes the number of devices connected to grow fast; therefore, the volume
of data flowing skyrockets, and, in consequence, tracking suspicious data and anomalies
becomes very difficult. These challenge the sensing capabilities of the organizations.
Besides, privacy and cybersecurity are not a plus anymore, but a responsibility and duty
for all the actors of the multistakeholder environment. According to a survey conducted by
EY [81], business continuity and disaster recovery resilience have become a high priority
for 57% of the respondents, data loss prevention for 56%, and security awareness and
training as a means to gain cyber resilience for 55%. There are standards and approaches
to cyber resilience promoted by industry, such as ISO 23316, which covers the principles
and guidelines for organizational resilience. The public sector, and particularly national
governments, are becoming increasingly involved. Such is the case in Scotland, for instance,
whose government has created a 3-year program (2018–2021) with a set of specific actions
pursuing to grow its national cybersecurity industry [82].
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The proposed FISHY architecture is perfectly aligned to this context of strong market
demands for products helping to increase cyber resilience, which is posed from both the
private and public sector, as referred above. FISHY responds to all these needs, providing
means to achieve higher cyber resilience guarantees. On top of this, it enables automatic
responses, providing the needed intelligence to carry out the self-reconfiguration of the
network without the intervention of operators, increasing the promptness, and thus dimin-
ishing human errors. Considering the multistakeholder aspect of supply chains, FISHY
will also address the issues derived from the cascading propagation of the consequences of
an attack, also focusing on mixing software and hardware attacks and the effects they both
may have on the articular requirements of multistakeholder supply chains.
The different stakeholders will benefit from the genuine features of the FISHY compo-
nents. Indeed, a successful FISFY platform adoption will open new business opportunities
on added-value security services, which will become strongly demanded in the market. In
short, (i) FISHY will bring several competitive advantages to network service providers
(NSPs), allowing them to address the requirements of different customers and sectors, to
expand their share in the value chain, evolving from network and connectivity providers
to cybersecurity service providers; (ii) technology providers and ICT system integrators
will benefit from FISHY, by means of new and more open ways of collaborating with
their network provider customers, thus facilitating their strategic position and gaining an
early-entrant advantage within the market of global cybersecurity solutions; (iii) vertical in-
dustries will become better enabled to apply advanced security mechanisms to their supply
chains, with a better understanding of their features and how their particular requirements
are addressed, as well as with the possibility of an open and independent verification
of security policies, their enforcement, and their associated SLAs; and, finally, (iv) small
and medium enterprises will acquire competitive advantages based on their business and
market segments, and will be provided with a unique opportunity to extend their offerings
and business advantages, towards an ICT global cybersecurity landscape, supporting new
business models to push forward the project’s innovations to key security stakeholders.
4.2. Potential Stoppers
Although the benefits brought in by the proposed FISHY architecture, in terms of
cyber resilience provisioning, are quite clear and relevant, some stoppers may hinder a
wide adoption of the proposed solution. Particularly, factors that may influence the real
FISHY relevance include the following:
- A low level of awareness about the need for clear responses to cyber threats, often due
to a false sense of security, especially at the management level, including CEOs and
boards of directors, those who have the power to decide on cybersecurity investments.
- Low levels of economic growth, insufficient funding, and unexpected interruptions for
future and ongoing security innovation initiatives. In the long run, a lack of political
support for these initiatives could be reflected in insufficient funding, but also in a fail-
ure of efforts devoted to deploying more-advanced security management capabilities.
- Misalignments in the technical and business evolution of some of the following
potential core application environments: energy, industry, health, etc., also including
network service provisioning itself.
- A changing regulatory landscape in network service provisioning and/or security, as
a response to the development and progress of novel business models and business
opportunities in the new networking market.
5. Proposed Use Cases
The FISHY architecture is designed to facilitate the deployment of a cyber-resilient
platform for supply chains of composed ICT systems. To that end, several real industrial
use cases are considered, with two main contributions. First, to assist on the definition
of real industry requirements, in terms of trust and cybersecurity, thus guaranteeing the
alignment of the FISHY design to the real needs. Second, to provide a real scenario where
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the FISHY architecture may be deployed, tested, and validated, also emphasizing the
potential benefits of such a deployment. In this section, we present three potential use
cases, i.e., farm-to-fork, wood-based panels trusted value-chain, and securing autonomous
driving function at the edge, and we also briefly introduce the expected benefits that the
proposed FISHY architecture may bring. For the sake of clarity, Table 2 summarizes the
expected benefits, along with the relevant stakeholders.
Table 2. Use cases benefits and key stakeholders.
Use Case Benefits Stakeholders
Farm-to-Fork
(1) designing a tailored solution for farm-to-fork-like supply
chain scenarios;
(2) enabling transactions between actors and devices
belonging to different (isolated) IoT silos;
(3) enabling trade of resources within the farm-to-fork
supply chain in an automated, trusted, and
decentralized way;
(4) adding an audit service for involved business parties to
identify and verify points of failure affecting product quality
as products are transported from the farm to the
selling point.




(1) enabling security at each integration layer;
(2) providing security, integrity and reliability of data flows
and systems resilience;
(3) ensuring the cybersecurity of all connected devices,
preventing attacks and incidents and guaranteeing the
availability of the production plants;
(4) making the security by design of the different integration
layers a must;
(5) enabling regular bidirectional data flows with external
entities by enforcing the necessary trust levels.
Raw materials suppliers, logistics
providers, machinery maintenance





(1) adding new functionalities (facial key and sensors
secure environment);
(2) certification of the different sensors and actuators
integrated in the car;
(3) enabling a proper, secure and private data collection;
(4) minimizing the security requirements impact on the car
by offloading the security applications into the edge.
OEMs, software developers, edge
providers, cloud providers, end users,
security developers
5.1. Farm-to-Fork Supply Chain (F2F)
During the last years, consumers’ demand for “safe” food, including organic, is
skyrocketing; thus, producers, manufacturers, sellers, and end-users are often struggling to
verify the accuracy of data across the whole supply chain of products (i.e., from the farm to
the fork). Yet, consumers, especially within such niche markets, such as organic food, are
increasingly willing to pay for products that provide this information. To date, solutions
have revolved around EU certifications and regulations, both of which add costs, are
hard to enforce, create everlasting bureaucratic processes, and, finally, can be confusing to
consumers. The challenge here is to obviate the need for a central trusted intermediary and,
instead, develop a decentralized process that, without the need of intermediaries, achieves
the same or even better (in terms of accuracy, trust, evidence, complexity) functionality as
today’s solutions. In this particular agricultural supply chain scenario, all the interested
stakeholders will be able to receive information about the conditions under which the
products have been cultivated, stored, and transported during their entire lifetime. This
use case elicits requirements from real supply chain business processes in the agri-food
sector that are involved in cultivating, tracking, tracing, and selling perishable goods.
For the sake of overall understanding, the lifecycle of agri-food products, from their
production to consumption point, is quite complex and involves a large number of actors
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and services, and may generate a vast amount of data. For example, inside the farm, a
perishable product could generate large volumes of related data (e.g., environmental condi-
tions, utilization of fertilizers, date of plantation and harvest, water resources consumption).
During transportation, data related to the preservation conditions (refrigerator temperature
and humidity), shipment details, and truck route (GPS data) until final destination can
be traced and stored in a distributed ledger, excluding the possibility of non-repudiation.
Additionally, data can be created in other intermediary places, such as distribution cen-
ters, keeping data with respect to warehouse conditions, final destination, responsible
employee, etc. Finally, all the data can be processed, and made available to consumers in
the supermarkets.
5.2. Wood-Based Panels Trusted Value-Chain (WBP TRUST)
The manufacturing of wood-based panels is conducted as a continuous process,
involving the feeding of raw materials (wood and resins from external suppliers), their
processing (through heat and pressure), and either final panels delivery (sanding and
cutting) or further processing (such as surfacing with decorative papers from external
suppliers). The panels are then supplied to industrial clients, large or small, in the sectors
of furniture manufacturing, flooring production, construction systems, or interior design
applications (e.g., wall paneling).
The requirements from those B2B clients, in terms of product quality, standards com-
pliance, and service levels, are more and more demanding. Moreover, the diversity, in terms
of the product mix (different sizes, thicknesses, finishes, or other product characteristics), is
also increasing. This context led involved companies to develop manufacturing strategies
in novel production plants, aiming at creating a digitally connected and collaborative
approach to manufacturing, exchanging data throughout the whole value-chain (upstream
and downstream) in a fast, reliable, and secure way. This strategy means bridging the gap
between two realities—information technology (IT) and operational technology (OT)—to
ensure security, resilience, and availability at all levels. This is achieved through an integra-
tion architecture that considers different layers, from the shop floor level to a corporate
level (holistic view of different production plants), also including an external layer that
facilitates data sharing and automation from a value-chain perspective (from raw materials
suppliers, logistics providers, and machinery maintenance companies to industrial clients).
Being a rather traditional industry, production plants typically rely on a wide number
of different machineries from different suppliers, some of them old and with outdated
software. These conditions challenge data from distinct contributors in the production line
to be properly extracted and integrated, thus making data sharing not so easy. Moreover,
a proper deployment of those novel manufacturing strategies requires strict connectivity
guarantees of those machines through sensors and IoT devices, in order to enable data
flows at the plant level (manufacturing floor), at the company level (between different
plants), and in an ecosystem perspective (with suppliers and clients). This also poses signif-
icant challenges to ensuring the security, integrity, and reliability of these data flows, and
the resilience of the whole set of systems in place. Assessing the risks and vulnerabilities of
all the equipment (machinery, sensors, PLCs, and others), and ensuring the cybersecurity
of all the connected devices, and, consequently, preventing attacks and incidents while
guaranteeing the availability (uptime) of the production plants, is of paramount impor-
tance. Additionally, from a value-chain perspective, ensuring the security by design of the
different integration layers (at the plant level, at a corporate level, and at an external level)
is key to foster trust, and to stimulate data sharing/mining, as well as the development
of novel value-added services. Unfortunately, the lack of a reference architecture and of
a comprehensive framework for value-chain systems connectivity poses several relevant
challenges to the implementation of such a vision. Indeed, nowadays, data at an OT level
is not shared with external entities.
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5.3. Securing Autonomous Driving Function at the Edge (SADE)
With the increasing number of electronic, intelligent embedded systems and connec-
tivity in cars, plus the impending revolution of the fully connected and autonomous cars,
security is becoming a major concern in the automobile industry, regulators, and also the
public. Indeed, “84-percent of automotive professionals have concerns that their organizational
cybersecurity practices are not keeping pace with evolving technologies” [83].
In practice, the aspects that have been widely adopted by manufacturers showing
strong concerns about cybersecurity, fall around both software in the automotive supply
chain and the level of connectivity in the connected car. On one hand, OEMs rely on
hundreds of providers for many of the embedded systems. This requires controlling
hundreds of different software versions within the car, posing challenges around SW
verifications and attestation, and how to regularly maintain and patch this software and
integrate it in a unified way within the automobile cybersecurity framework. On the other
hand, automobile systems are now more exposed to remote risks and tampering.
In order to tackle these two major challenges, OEMs are introducing more-complex
systems into the cars, such as firewalls and gateways, which are new systems that are
also prone to risks, updates, and maintenance by the OEMs. Besides the best practices,
such as security testing prior to release, patching or managing a homogenous/consistent
secure software development lifecycle becomes more and more challenging. Usually, the
industry relies on patching, dynamic security testing, and penetration testing during its
development phase, to address some of them, but once the car is released, the increasing
volume of electronics (sensors, actuators, gateways, firewalls, and ECUs) makes it difficult
to maintain (i.e., development and patching) the systems. This also leads to concerns
about new functions that OEMs may consider deploying, especially when sensitive user
information is stored in any embedded system (this applies specially to any biometric
information of the user). In this context, the automobile industry tends to shift most of the
intelligence to the cloud, in order to simplify all car electronics. This trend is being boosted
by upcoming technologies, such as 5G, C-V2X, 802.11P, and edge computing.
6. Conclusions
This paper puts the focus on a highly attractive scenario, that is, cyber resilience
provisioning in supply chains built on complex ICT systems. The contribution starts by
identifying the key challenges, still demanding specific attention by the scientific commu-
nity, justified by a thorough review of the current literature in those key research areas that
are strongly linked to the main objective. Then, from a technical view, the paper introduces
a functional architecture aimed at addressing the specific challenges previously identified
by that particular supply chain context.
Beyond the functional architecture definition, it is worth mentioning the use case
scenarios shown as key examples, where the proposed architecture may be deployed at, as
well as the benefits such a deployment may bring in to these scenarios and, what, indeed,
is the main rationale for the architecture definition.
This paper may be read as both a wide survey of existing contributions in the well-
identified research areas aligned to the main supply chain paper target, as well as a
benchmarking report, in terms of either architectural design and/or real benefits for other
similar initiatives.
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Abbreviations
The next abbreviations are used in this paper.
AI Artificial Intelligence
AWS Amazon Web Services
B2B Business to business
COPS Common Open Policy Service
DLT Distributed Ledger Technology
ECA Event-Condition-Action
EDC Enforcement and Dynamic Configuration
F2F Farm-to-Fork
IBN Intent-Based Networking
ICT Information and Communication Technologies
IdM Current identity Management
IDS Intrusion Detection Systems
IETF Internet Engineering Task Force
IoT Internet of Things
IPFS InterPlanetary File System
IPS Intrusion Prevention Systems
IPSec Internet Protocol Security
IRO Intent-Based Resilience Orchestrator and Dashboard
IT Information Technology
JSON JavaScript Object Notation
MAC Media Access Control
MDGSM Method for Designing Good Security Metrics
MISP Malware Information Sharing Platform
ML Machine Learning
NED Network Edge Device
NETCONF Network Configuration Protocol
NFVO NFV Orchestrator
NFV Network Function Virtualization
NIST US National Institute for Standards and Technology
NLP Natural Language Processing
NSF Network Security Function
NSP Network Service Provider
OEM Original Equipment Manufacturer
ONOS Open network Operating System
OT Operation Technology
PBNM Policy Based Network Management
PLC Programmable Logic Controller
SADE Securing Autonomous Driving Function at the Edge
SACM Security Assurance and Certification Management
SCM Security and Certification Manager
SDN Software Defined Networking
SEN Secure Edge Node
SIA Secure Infrastructure Abstraction
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SIEM Security Information and Event Management
SNMP Simple Network Management Protocol
SME Small and Medium Enterprise
SUPA Simplified Use of Policy Abstraction
TLS Transport Layer Security
TM Trust Manager
TPM Trusted Platform Module
VNF Virtualized Network Function
WBP TRUST Wood-Based Panels Trusted Value-Chain
XML Extensible Markup Language
YANG Yet Another Next Generation
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